Substantial average gender differences in childhood play behaviour and occupational interests have been well-documented. Recent research shows that childhood gender-related play behaviour longitudinally predicts gender-related occupational interests in adolescence. The first aim of the present study was to extend this recent finding by examining whether university students’ recalled childhood gender-related play behaviour predicts their current gender-related occupational interests. The second aim of the present study was to investigate whether gender-related socio-cognitive processes mediate the relation between childhood play behaviour and subsequent (...) occupational interests. University students completed scales assessing recalled childhood gender-related play behaviour, gender-related occupational interests, gender typicality, gender contentedness, agentic goal endorsement, communal goal endorsement, and gender-related occupational stereotype flexibility. In the present study, recalled childhood gender-related play behaviour predicted gender-related occupational interests in both men and women. In men, gender typicality and gender contentedness mediated the play-interests link. In women, gender typicality and communal goal endorsement mediated the play-interests link. The present study provides further evidence that childhood gender-related play behaviour is related to subsequent gender-related occupational interests. Although the current study has a correlational design, one interpretation of the current findings is that childhood play may influence socio-cognitive processes, such as gender compatibility and goal endorsement, which may in turn shape occupational interests. (shrink)

This paper is a reaction to G. Küng's and J. T. Canty's Substitutional Quantification and Leniewskian quantifiers'Theoria 36 (1970), 165–182. I reject their arguments that quantifiers in Ontology cannot be referentially interpreted but I grant that there is what can be called objectual — referential interpretation of quantifiers and that because of the unrestricted quantification in Ontology the quantifiers in Ontology should not be given a so-called objectual-referential interpretation. I explain why I am in agreement with Küng and Canty's recommendation (...) that Ontology's quantifiers not be substitutionally interpreted even if Leniewski intended them to be so interpreted. A notion of an interpretation which is referential but yet which does not interpret as an assertor of existence of objects in a domain is developed. It is then shown that a first order version of Ontology is satisfied by those special kind of referential interpretations which read as Something as epposed to Something existing. (shrink)

The JTB definition of knowledge has been shown by Gettier to be incomplete: its three conditions are necessary for knowledge, but not sufficient. We argue that the JTB definition can be completed with a very simple fourth condition, namely that the justification for the belief in p must be sufficient to exclude ¬p. It is shown that the resulting JTB+S definition solves the Gettier problem.

It is a common refrain amongst phenomenologists, disability theorists, and feminist legal theorists that medical practice pays insufficient attention to people’s embodiment. The complaint that we take insufficient account of people’s embodiment isn’t limited to the clinical interaction. It has also been directed at healthcare regulation and welfare policy. In this paper, I examine the arguments for taking embodiment seriously in both medical practice and welfare policy, concluding we have good reasons to take better account of people’s embodiment. I then (...) set out two challenges to taking embodiment seriously in public policy. First, given the amount of variation in how people are embodied, there is strong possibility that adjusting policy to benefit particular individuals based on an appreciation of their embodied experiences could be detrimental towards other individuals. The second challenge concerns how to ensure that people’s testimony about their first-person embodied experience is subject to adequate scrutiny without this resulting in epistemic injustice. I argue that the solution to both of these challenges is to devise a just procedure for soliciting people’s testimony and taking it into account in the policy development process. As such, I also provide an outline of what a just procedure should look like. (shrink)

Spontaneous abortion is rarely addressed in moral evaluations of abortion. Indeed, 'abortion' is virtually always taken to mean only induced abortion. After a brief review of medical aspects of spontaneous abortion, I attempt to articulate the moral implications of spontaneous abortion for the two poles of the abortion debate, the strong pro-abortion and the strong anti-abortion positions. I claim that spontaneous abortion has no moral relevance for strict pro-abortion positions but that the high incidence of spontaneous abortion is not (as (...) some claim) eo ipso any sort of justification for voluntarily induced abortion. Secondly, I show that if the strict anti-abortionist position is to be taken seriously in its insistence that prenatal life has a right to be protected by virtue of its being conceived, then it seems necessary to take measures to prevent spontaneous abortion and its presumptive causes, and this as a matter of moral obligation. (shrink)

This book explores the theories of transhumanism and posthumanism, two philosophies that deal with radically changing bodies, minds, and even the nature of humanity itself.

There are religious and philosophical versions of the thesis that AIDS is a punishment for homosexual behaviour. It is argued here that the religious version is seriously incomplete. Because of this incompleteness and because of the indeterminacies that ordinarily attend religious argumentation, it is concluded that the claim may be set aside as unconvincing. Homosexual behaviour is then judged for its morality against utilitarian, deontological, and natural law theories of ethics. It is argued that such behaviour involves no impediment to (...) important moral goals and is not therefore immoral. Where natural law might be used to condemn homosexual behaviour, it is argued that the theory itself is not well established. Consequently there is a prima facie reason for rejecting the philosophical version of the punishment thesis. This conclusion is further supported by noting the lack of proportion between the purported immorality of homosexuality and a punishment as devastating as AIDS. (shrink)

The fourth volume in Luigi Pareyson’s collection of Philosophica varia inedita vel rariora published in Turin. All four have dealt with Schelling. Two presented unpublished texts edited by M. Vetö and Horst Fuhrmans. This volume and its companion, Schelling im Spiegel seiner Zeitgenossen, are large collections of hitherto unpublished documents pertaining to the life and work of the idealist philosopher.

The article examines wittgenstein's theory of quantification as it appears in the "tractatus". it is argued that wittgenstein advances a theory of quantification and a theory of generality where most contemporary writers on the subject hold a single theory of quantification incorporating both quantification proper and generality. having established this it is shown that wittgenstein theory of quantification is truth functional and not substitutional as recent authors have suggested.

In the course of discussing Kleisthenes' reforms, the author of theAthenaion Politeiamakes the following statement:And he made those who were currently living in each of the demes demesmen of one another, so that they would not examine the new citizens by calling out their patronymic, rather they would announce them by demes; and from this practice, the Athenians call themselves after their demes.

Translations show an appreciation of the technical sense with which is endowed in this passage but the terminology which they employ to express that sense is unfortunate. The English term ‘declination’ when used technically in an astronomical context is irreconcilable with the connotations of the Greek term as used in this particular astronomical context. Allowing the technical meaning normal for it in such passages, upon Plutarch's wording, here compressed almost into incomprehensibility, the following construction must be put.